

Message Text

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ACTION EB-07

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-06 NEA-09 IO-10 ISO-00

ERDA-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00 CIEP-01 COME-00 DODE-00

FEAE-00 FPC-01 H-02 INR-07 INT-05 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05

OMB-01 PM-03 SAM-01 OES-03 SP-02 SS-15 STR-04 TRSE-00

FRB-03 /123 W

----- 095209

R 291430Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8926

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY CARACAS

AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION OECD PARIS

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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

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AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY OSLO
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AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
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AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY LAPAZ
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NY
INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BRASILIA 3275

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, BR
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN REACTION TO PREPCON

REF: BRASILIA 3178

1. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR CABRAL DE MELLO, HEAD OF
BRAZILIAN DELEGATION, DEFENDS POSITION OF THE "SEVEN" AT
PARIS PREPCON, AS FOLLOWS: CENTRAL ISSUE FOR THE SEVEN
WAS THE NEED FOR A "POLITICAL ACT" BY THE DC'S TO ACKNOWLEDGE
THE LEGITIMACY OF TOPICS OTHER THAN ENERGY, RATHER THAN
THE CAPACITY OF THE FULL CONFERENCE TO HANDLE IN DETAIL
ALL THE ISSUES ON EXPANDED AGENDA. POSITION OF SEVEN
DID NOT FORECLOSE -- AND, IN FACT, EVEN ENVISAGED --
THAT FULL CONFERENCE WOULD DEAL WITH SOME TOPICS ONLY
LIGHTLY AND IN GENERAL TERMS, BY REFERRING TO WORK OF
OTHER UN BODIES. SEVEN, HOWEVER, WERE NOT WILLING TO
MAKE THIS EXPLICIT, INASMUCH AS THEY WERE LOOKING FOR
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"POLITICAL ACT" FROM DCS. BRAZILIAN EFFORT TO
SEEK COMPROMISE, THROUGH A MORE GENERALIZED AGENDA,
WAS THUS QUITE COMPATIBLE WITH VIABLE AND
CONSTRUCTIVE CONFERENCE. IN THEIR FINAL FORM, THE TWO
AGENDAS WERE QUITE CLOSE. TO HAVE PERMITTED PREPCON
TO FAIL ON REMAINING DIFFERENCES WAS "POLITICALLY IMPRUDENT."
NEXT STEP SHOULD BE QUIET US DIALOGUE WITH THE
MORE MODERATE PRODUCER COUNTRIES -- IRAN AND, PARTICULARLY,

SAUDI ARABIA -- WHICH, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, WOULD HAVE THE CONTROLLING VOICE OVER THE POSITION OF THE SEVEN. VENEZUELA WOULD BE FOUND TO BE "FLEXIBLE." END SUMMARY.

2. FOLLOWING A NATIONAL HOLIDAY AND THE BRAZILIAN DIPLOMATS DAY, ECON COUNSELOR MET WITH AMASSADOR CABRAL DE MELLO (HEAD OF BRAZILIAN PREPCON DELEGATION) ON APRIL 24 FOR A REVIEW OF HIS IMPRESSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

3. CABRAL DE MELLO'S CENTRAL THESIS WAS THAT THE FINAL VERSION OF THE TWO AGENDAS WERE IN FACT FAIRLY CLOSE AND THAT IT WAS "POLITICALLY IMPRUDENT" TO HAVE LET THE PREPCON FAIL OVER THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES. BRAZIL HAD TRIED TO FIND A COMPROMISE BY DELETING FROM THE DRAFT AGENDAS TERMS AND CONCEPTS OBJECTIONABLE TO EITHER SIDE (IN GENERAL, HE ADMITTED, BY TRYING TO FIND BROADER, MORE ENCOMPASSING TERMINOLOGY). TO THE ARGUMENT THAT THE FULL CONFERENCE COULD NOT HAVE HANDLED SUCH A VAST AGENDA, HIS REBUTTAL WAS:

A. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THE SEVEN WAS TO OBTAIN RECOGNITION OF THE LEGITIMACY OF TOPICS OTHER THAN ENERGY. THE SEVEN WERE LOOKING FOR A "POLITICAL ACT" BY THE DC, ACKNOWLEDGING, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE, THAT THE POLITICAL AND ETHICAL VALUES UNDERLYING A COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO ENERGY WERE ALSO APPLICABLE TO OTHER COMMODITIES AND THEIR PROBLEMS. (IN PASSING, HE NOTED THAT IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT UNDERSTANDINGS IN THE ENERGY AREA WOULD NOT ESTABLISH PRECEDENTS FOR THE TREATMENT OF OTHER COMMODITIES. THUS, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE DC WOULD NOT HAVE "GIVEN ANYTHING AWAY.")

B. THE SEVEN HAD BEEN COGNIZANT OF THE POINT THAT MANY CONFIDENTIAL

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OF THESE ISSUES OTHER THAN ENERGY WERE ALREADY BEING ADDRESSED IN OTHER FORMS. THE AGENDA OFFERED BY THE SEVEN DID NOT PRECLUDE (AND, IN FACT IMPLICITLY ENVISAGED) POSSIBILITY THAT SOME OF THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE FULL CONFERENCE WOULD SIMPLY REAFFIRM THE MANDATE OF THESE OTHER BODIES -- OR, PERHAPS PROVIDE SOME GENERAL POLITICAL INPUT TO HELP PUSH THEIR WORK ALONG. WHILE SOME OF THESE OTHER GROUPS WERE DOING WELL, THE WORK IN MANY -- PERHAPS THE MAJORITY -- REMAINED INCLUSIVE BECAUSE IT LACKED A POLITICAL IMPETUS FROM THE KEY COUNTRIES.

C. THE POSITION OF THE SEVEN, THUS, DID NOT IMPLY THAT ALL THE TOPICS BEFORE THE FULL CONFERENCE HAD TO BE TREATED IN EQUAL OPERATIONAL DETAIL. SOME -- SUCH AS ENERGY -- WOULD BE, BUT IN THE CASE OF OTHERS THE CONFERENCE

WOULD LIMIT ITSELF TO A RECOGNITION OF BROAD PRINCIPLES, OR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE WORK GOING FORWARD IN OTHER BODIES. CONTACTS BEFORE THE CONFERENCE, AS PART OF THE CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS, COULD HELP CLARIFY HOW EACH OF THESE TOPICS WAS TO BE TREATED. (IN A REVEALING SIDE COMMENT AT A LATER POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, CABRAL DE MELLO HOWEVER ACKNOWLEDGED THE ALGERIAN OBJECTIVE TO USE THE ENERGY ISSUE AS A BARGAINING LEVER TO EXTRACT SPECIFIC CONCESSIONS ON THE TREATMENT OF OTHER COMMODITIES: AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, NOTED THE ALGERIAN CONVICTION THAT THE OPEC GROUP HAD ONLY A FEW YEARS TO DO SO.)

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INFO OCT-01 AF-06 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-06 NEA-09 IO-10 ISO-00

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OMB-01 PM-03 SAM-01 OES-03 SP-02 SS-15 STR-04 TRSE-00

FRB-03 /123 W

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USMISSION GENEVA
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INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BRASILIA 3275

4. CABRAL DE MELLO WAS EQUALLY FIRM IN HIS DEFENSE OF THE POSITION TAKEN BY SEVEN ON THE OBSERVER STATUS OF THE IEA. HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE SEVEN WOULD NEVER AGREE TO THIS AND THAT THE DC GROUP WOULD ULTIMATELY HAVE TO ACCEPT A FORMULA UNDER WHICH IEA CHAIRMAN WOULD PARTICIPATE UNDER RUBRIC OF OECD. (THIS WAS THE ONE POINT IN THE CONVERSATION AT WHICH CABRAL DE MELLO SHOWED CLEAR SIGN OF CONSIDERABLE ANIMUS.) HE SAID DC POSITION IN FAVOR OF FULL OBSERVER STATUS FOR IEA SEEMED TO HIM EXTREMELY WEAK -- HE DID NOT ELABORATE -- AND, IN SUPPORT, CITED ATTEMPT BY DC CROUP TO INSERT IEA OBSERVER INTO THE CONTACT GROUP.

5. CABRAL DE MELLO STRESSED THAT RELATIONS AMONG THE DELEGATIONS

HAD REMAINED VERY GOOD, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERY GREAT STRESS UNDER WHICH THEY HAD BEEN WORKING, AND HE RECALLED WITH SATISFACTION AND PLEASURE HIS OWN CONTACTS WITH THE US AS WELL AS SEVERAL OF THE PRODUCER COUNTRY

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DELEGATIONS. THE MEETING HAD SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED A CONFRONTATION ATMOSPHERE AND MAINTAINED THE BASIS FOR FURTHER DIALOGUE. THE ISSUES, QUITE SIMPLY, HAD NOT YET "MATURED" POLITICALLY TO THE POINT WHERE THE PREPCON COULD COME TO GRIPS WITH THEM. (COMMENT: BY THIS, HE VERY CLEARLY MEANT AN EVOLUTION OF THE VIEWS AND ATTITUDES OF DC GOVERNMENTS THAT WOULD PERMIT THEM TO TAKE "THE POLITICAL ACT" SOUGHT BY THE SEVEN.)

6. WITH RESPECT TO NEXT STEPS, CABRAL DE MELLO THOUGHT THIS WAS LARGELY UP TO THE US - PERHAPS ALSO PRESIDENT GISCARD. THERE SHOULD BE A PERIOD OF QUIET CONFIDENTIAL DIALOGUE. HE ASSUMED THE US WAS OR WAS ABOUT TO BE LAUNCHING ON THIS. BRAZIL WAS DOING SO ALSO, PARTICULARLY WITH THE VENEZUELAN. HE HAD FOUND SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN REALISTIC AND PRAGMATIC, ALTHOUGH SAUDI ARABIA CONSIDERABLY MORE SO THAN IRAN WITH ITS POLITICAL AMBITIONS. HE ASSUMED THE US DIALOGUE WOULD BE DIRECTED PARTICULARLY TOWARD THESE TWO COUNTRIES. ALGERIA, DESPITE ITS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP PRETENSIONS -- THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION HE DOWN-PLAYED ALGERIA'S ROLE AT THE CONFERENCE -- COULD NOT ACT, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, AGAINST THE WISHES OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES. SAUDI ARABIA WAS GREATLY INTERESTED IN A TECHNICALLY SOUND, NON-IDEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE ENERGY PROBLEM. IT WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED WITH THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF PETROLEUM, SUCH AS THE DISPOSITION AND MAINTENANCE OF VALUE OF ITS REVENUES. (COMMENT: CABRAL DE MELLO FOUND SAUDI ARABIA'S DELEGATE, THE HEAD OF PETROMIN, PARTICULARLY CONGENIAL AND IMPRESSIVE.) VENEZUELA WOULD BE "FLEXIBLE." (COMMENT: CABRAL DE MELLO SHOWED SENSITIVITY ABOUT THE ALGERIAN-VENEZUELAN TIE.)

7. CABRAL DE MELLO GAVE NO CLEAR INDICATION OF GOB CONTACTS WITH OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, ALTHOUGH WE ASSUME THERE HAS BEEN A POSTMORTEM WITH THE FRENCH.

8. COMMENT: CABRAL DE MELLO'S VIGOROUS DEFENSE OF THE SEVEN CONTACTS MARKEDLY WITH THE LOW PROFILE MAINTAINED BY BRAZILIAN DELEGATION DURING MOST OF THE PREPCON. IT IS

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CONSISTENT, HOWEVER, WITH DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE TAKEN BY GOB DURING THE MEETING. IT IMPLIES -- ALTHOUGH CABRAL DE MELLO NEVER SAID SO DIRECTLY -- SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY BY GOB DELEGATE WITHIN THE CAUCUS OF THE SEVEN. STRIKINGLY ABSENT IS ANY REFERENCE TO, OR RECOGNITION OF, A POLICY DILEMMA FOR THE GOB WHICH PRIOR TO THE PREPCON HAD SOUGHT TO AVOID OVERLY CLOSE IDENTIFICATION WITH EITHER CONSUMERS OR PRODUCERS. (THIS DILEMMA WAS, HOWEVER, OPENLY RECOGNIZED AND DEVELOPED AT SOME LENGTH IN THE DISPATCHES OF THE JOURNAL DO BRASIL'S PARIS CORRESPONDENT.) ALTHOUGH THE CONVERSATION CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS ENCOURAGING, IN TERMS OF BRAZILIAN SENSITIVITY TO US INTERESTS AND VIEWS, AND ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE ARGUMENTATION SEEMS SO US DISINGENUOUS, WE GAINED IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS DEFINITE INTEREST IN A DIALOGUE ON POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS. SUMMARY OF BRAZILIAN PRESS TREATMENT CONTAINED REFTEL (BRASILIA 3178).
CRIMMINS

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETING AGENDA, PLANNING MEETINGS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 29 APR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975BRASIL03275
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750150-0262
From: BRASILIA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t1975045/aaaaaeak.tel
Line Count: 351
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EB
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 BRASILIA 3178
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
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Margaret P. Grafeld
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05 JUL 2006

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Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BRAZILIAN REACTION TO PREPCON
TAGS: ENRG, BR, US, (DE MELLO, CABRAL)
To: STATE
Type: TE
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